JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
THE DETERMINANTS OF UNIONIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERAREA DIFFERENCES
BARRY T. HIRSCH LARGE differences in the level of unionization exist across regions, states, and metropolitan areas. While these differences have long been of interest to both researchers and the public, a paucity of cross-section data on unionization has hampered research in this area. Apart from several studies using state data-all concerned primarily with isolating the effects of rightto-work laws-little empirical evidence exists on the ability of economic models to explain interarea variation in unionization levels.'
This study examines the reasons for differences among metropolitan areas in collective bargaining coverage and in union membership. The author employs an economic framework in which equilibrium levels of unionization are viewed as determined by demand and supply forces. The author finds that both measures of unionization are significantly related to earnings level, occupation, and industry structure; sex and racial composition of the labor force, region, and population growth have a smaller effect; and right-towork laws have little, if any, effect on collective bargaining coverage but may significantly decrease union membership.
Barry T. Hirsch is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro. The study was supported by funds from the Center for Applied Research at UNC-Greensboro. The author would like to thank Terry G. Seaks, Walter Wessels, and participants in the Labor and Applied Economics Workshop at UNCChapel Hill.-EDITOR 'Studies using state data to estimate the effects of right-to-work (RTW) laws include William J. Moore and Robert J. Newman, "On the Prospects for American Trade Union Growth: A Cross-Section Analysis," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 57, No. 4 (November 1975) , pp. 435-45; Keith Lumsden and Craig Petersen, "The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unionization in the United States," Journal of Po-A recent paper by Freeman and Medoff makes available for the first time data on union membership by Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).2 In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics for some time has published data obtained from establishment surveys on coverage of collective bargaining agreements by SMSA.3 For a number of reasons discussed below, the SMSA is preferable to the state as a unit of observation. This study utilizes these two sources of SMSA data to examine the determinants of interarea variation in unionizalitical Economy, Vol. 83, No. 6 (December 1975) , pp. 1237-48; Ronald S. Warren, Jr. and Robert P. Strauss, "A Mixed Logit Model of the Relationship Between Unionization and Right-to-Work Legislation," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 3 (June 1979) , pp. 648 -55; and Walter J. Wessels, "Economic Effects of the Right-to-Work Laws," paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meetings, November 1978 in Washington, D.C. Other literature providing more fragmentary evidence on RTW laws is referenced in these articles. Papers examining the growth of trade unionism over time include Orley Ashenfelter and John H. Pencavel, "American Trade Union Growth: 1900 -1960 ," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 83, No. 3 (August 1969 , pp. 434 -48, and William J. Moore and Douglas K. Pearce, "Union Growth: A Test of the AshenfelterPencavel Model," Industrial Relations, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 1976), pp. 244-47. 2Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 1979) , pp. 143-74. They suggested that "an analysis of cross-SMSA differences in the percent organized represents a potentially interesting and fruitful topic for future research," (p. 167).
3See, for example, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Area Wage Surveys: Selected Metropolitan Areas 1969 -1970 , Bulletin No. 1660 -1691 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1971 ), p. 6. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (January 1980 . ?) 1980 by Cornell University.
0019-7939/79/3302-0147$00.75 147 tion levels. An economic framework is developed in which the equilibrium level of unionization is viewed as resulting from the interaction of the demand for and supply of union services. The use of alternative unionization variables, differing in both definition and source from previously analyzed data, increases our confidence in the appropriateness of the models used and provides information that cannot easily be gleaned from previous studies. In particular, the differential effects of right-to-work laws on collective bargaining coverage and on union membership are analyzed in greater detail than in previous research.
Determination of Union Levels: An Economic Framework In this study union membership is treated as an asset that provides a flow of services to utility-maximizing workers over time. Worker demand for union services is a function of the price of the asset, income, tastes or preferences, and the relative attractiveness (price) of alternatives. The supply of union services is determined by the supply price, organizing costs, and the costs of providing services.4 The equilibrium level of union membership in any given labor market is regarded as being determined by the interaction of demand and supply.5 We assume that the market for union services is in equilibrium so that the quantities of union services demanded and supplied are equal. Thus, a reduced form of the model can be examined in which the flow of union services is a function of the model's exogenous variables. An advantage of this approach is that price (for which data are lack4Unions need not behave like profit-maximizing firms and, in fact, generally pursue multiple objectives. However, the supply of union services should be negatively related to costs under almost any model of union behavior. For a discussion of union goals within an economic framework, see Wallace N. Atherton, Theory of Union Bargaining Goals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
5A framework in which union membership is treated as an asset in a worker's portfolio is developed in John H. Pencavel, "The Demand for Union Services: An Exercise," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January 1971), pp. 180-90 , and used by Lumsden and Petersen, "The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unionization in the United S tates. " ing) falls out of the model. The model is simplistic and unrealistic in some major respects, but it provides a useful framework with which to analyze and interpret the major determinants of unionization.
Statistical implementation of such a model requires more precise specification. Those factors that are expected to influence the level of unionization within the demand-supply framework are discussed below.
Earnings. For a normal good, consumer demand theory implies that demand for union services will increase with income or earnings. However, unionization and earnings are simultaneously determined: not only do higher earnings result in an increased propensity to join a union, but being a union member can result in higher earnings. Thus, the determination of earnings (or wage rates) and unionization should be estimated simultaneously.6 Simultaneity is a less serious problem, however, when aggregated SMSA data, rather than individual or industry data, are used. While unions do create wage differentials between otherwise similar workers, they have mnuch less ability to increase the level of income for labor as a whole. Causation is therefore expected to run primarily from earnings to demand, not from unionization to earnings. In this study, we utilize the SiVISA's earnings level to capture the positive income effect on the demand for union services and an instrumental variable technique to account for simultaneity.
The propensity to join a union will also be a function of the relative earnings differential between union and nonunion workers. We do not have data on these differentials by SMSA. To the extent that interarea variation in earnings differentials are re6For instance, see Peter Schmidt and Robert P. lated to worker characteristics, industry mix, or region, however, these effects will be captured by other variables in the model.
Labor-force characteristics. Both the benefits from unionization and the costs of union organizing will differ among workers in the labor force according to such personal characteristics as occupation and the sex, race, and age composition of the labor force. Tastes for unionization, benefits from unionization, and organizing costs are likely to vary among workers across occupations or of different schooling levels, for example. White-collar workers will generally be less prone than blue-collar workers to demand union services due to greater mobility across firms and labor markets, greater skill differentiation within the job hierarchy, greater identification with muanagemnent, a higher probability of being self-employed, and a higher probability of part-time employment for sales and clerical workers. A variable that measures the percentage of white-collar workers (professional and technical, managers and administrators, sales, and clerical) is thus expected to be negatively related to unionization. On the other hand, it is difficult to predict any systematic relationship between education level and unionization after accounting for differences in occupational structure and earnings level.
Because women, on average, have less permanent attachment to the labor market and to specific internal job ladders than men, the expected benefits (particularly nonwage benefits) from being a union member may be smaller for female workers and the costs of organizing, greater. Of course, lower unionization among women results not only from a lower propensity to join a union, but also from the fact that women are more likely to work in less-unionized industries and in white-collar occupations. The effect of sex per se may be small. Freeman and Medoff found that women covered by collective bargaining agreements are less likely to be union members than are men.7 Thus, the effect of the sex structure should be more significant on union membership than on bargaining coverage. The percent 7Freeman and Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism," of females who are in the labor force is used to measure the relationship between unionization and sex.8
The age structure of a labor market may be related to its level of unionization. Because senior workers have relatively high job attachment and low mobility, their expected benefits from unionization are high (in the form of institutionalized work rules, strict seniority systems, grievance procedures, and health and pension benefits), while organizing costs may be relatively low. On the other hand, older workers will expect to receive their flow of nonpension benefits for a shorter time period than younger workers, thereby decreasing their demand for union services. Thus, the net effect of age on unionization maybe small.
The percentage of nonwhites in the labor force might affect unionization in two opposing ways. On the one hand, unions may discriminate in organizing their membership or blacks may be less likely to be employed in union jobs due to past or present employment discrimination. On the other hand, relative wage gains from unionization are probably greatest for nonwhite workers.9 A race variable will capture these opposing effects, but the net relationship between race and unionization cannot be predicted a priori.
Worker and employer attitudes and region. Attitudes toward unions by both workers and employers affect equilibrium levels of unionization. Worker attitudes significantly affect both the demand for union services and the supply (by their effect on organizing costs). Employer behavior also influences organizing costs and workers' expected returns from unionization. Since 8An SMSA's female labor-force-participation rate is used as a proxy for the percentage of the labor force that is female in order to reduce multicollinearity with the earnings, occupation, and industry variables.
9Evidence on the relative wage effects of unions by race is provided in Nicholas Kiefer and Sharon P. Smith, "Union Impact and Wage Discrimination by Region," Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1977) attitudes cannot be easily measured or quantified, one must utilize imperfect proxies. As a measure of tastes this study employs regional dummy variables for each of the nine major census regions. These variables are expected to capture differences not only in attitudes but also in labor-force characteristics and industrial structure not precisely measured by other variables in the model. For instance, it is expected that unionization is lower in the Southeast, even after accounting for all other measurable determinants.'0 Right-to-work laws. Twenty states currently possess right-to-work (RTW) laws under which workers covered by union negotiated contracts cannot be required to join a union as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment." Despite the heated rhetoric of both proponents and opponents of RTW laws and the widespread belief that the issue is one of some economic importance, little evidence exists that RTW laws have a significant deterrent effect on unionization. Of the empirical studies of this subject cited in footnote 1, those by Moore and Newman, Lumsden and Petersen, and Wessels have demonstrated that RTW laws have at most a small and never statistically significant deterrent effect on state levels of unionization. Only the study by Warren and Strauss concludes that RTW laws decrease state unionization significantly. All of these studies point out that '0As an alternative measure of attitudes an index was constructed measuring the percentage of times a state's congressional delegation voted in accordance with the position taken by the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (SMSAs were generally assigned the state rating). This index was not found to be significantly related to unionization levels, however, because the index suffered from serious measurement error, because attitudes are only weakly related to unionization, or because relevant differences in attitude are captured by the models' other variables. For a more interesting measure of state RTW sentiment, see Wessels, "Economic Effects of the Right-toWork Laws." 11These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Louisiana, which adopted its right-to-work law in 1976, was not counted as a RTW state in the analysis.
RTW laws are endogenous to a state, their passage being determined in part by local attitudes and the extent of unionization. Each uses a different method of analysis, however, to account for the endogeneity of RTW laws. Of course the finding that RTW laws have little effect on state unionization does not necessarily mean that they do not affect SMSA unionization significantly within states or that an exogenous change in RTW legislation at the federal level would not have an effect.
The effects of RTW laws on collective bargaining coverage are likely to differ from their effects on union membership. There is little direct relationship between these laws and the ability of unions to organize. Workers in interstate commerce in RTW states enjoy the same legal protection to organize as in non-RTW states, since all are covered by the National Labor Relations Act, and unions in RTW states are free to bargain over all standard subjects apart from the provision of a compulsory dues or membership clause in the contract. A RTW law may affect contract coverage if unions' organizing efforts change in response to the law, but the direction of this change is indeterminate. National unions, in an attempt to prevent serious labor-cost discrepancies among competing firms, may direct relatively greater effort to shore up weak affiliates, many of which are in RTW states. On the other hand, if national unions primarily seek to maximize their total membership, they should allocate resources so that the marginal cost of obtaining an additional member is equal across labor markets. In that case, if workers in RTW states are more costly to organize, for whatever reasons, unions will spend relatively less effort in RTW states. In addition, workers may perceive the expected future bargaining strength of the union as relatively low if many workers refuse to join. On the other hand, some workers might vote for union representation only if they need not bear the cost of membership.
While the net effect of RTW laws on contract coverage is likely to be quite small, their effect on union membership may be more significant. Because of free-rider problems-all members of bargaining units re-ceive benefits from collective bargaining regardless of whether they bear the costs of membership-union membership is expected to be lower in labor markets covered by RTW laws. However, the effect of those laws on membership may be small if pressure from other employees (or the employer) persuades most workers to join. That possibility can be regarded as a tie-in between the sale of a nonexcludable public good (collective bargaining benefits) and of an excludable private good (good personal relationships with coworkers), thus lessening freerider effects. This study will attempt to isolate the effects of RTW laws on collective bargaining coverage and on union membership, after accounting for other determinants of unionization.
Population growth. Unionization is expected to be lower in those SMSAs showing the most rapid population growth. These labor markets will tend to have labor-force members who are relatively more mobile and have less permanent job attachment; the effect will be decreased demand for unionization and increased organizing costs. The secular decline in private sector unionism also implies that SMSAs with recent rapid growth will have a lower percentage of their labor force organized. For instance, lower unionization in the South and the West than in the country as a whole may be the result, in part, of the recent rapid growth in those areas.
Industry structure. A considerable amount of existing evidence indicates that unionization is higher in more concentrated industries utilizing skilled blue-collar labor, in industries in which control of key ports of entry makes the substitution of nonunion labor difficult (as in shipping, for example), and in public and nonprofit sectors (such as the post office, transportation, communication, and utilities). In terms of the demand and supply model presented here, unionization is expected to be greater in those industries in which organizing costs are lowest and the expected returns (in the form of wage gains, for instance) are highest.
Firms in highly concentrated industries may be less costly to organize because these industries are generally characterized by fewer firms, more large-scale production, and fewer plants that are, in addition, less widely dispersed. This contrasts sharply with the high organizing costs in more competitive industries characterized by numerous firms with relatively small-scale production and widely dispersed plants (such as textiles and furniture).
The expected return from unionization, or the ability of unions to extract wage (and nonwage) gains from employers, can be analyzed by focusing on the elasticity of demand for labor. Unions are relatively more successful at organizing and raising wages in situations in which employment is relatively insensitive to wage changes. In turn, demand is more inelastic the more difficult is substitution in production by firms and in consumption by households.'2 The elasticity of demand facing union (or potential union) workers therefore varies considerably among firms in different industries. Unionization is expected to be greater in more concentrated industries, where firms' demand for labor inputs (derived from their product demand curves) is often more inelastic than for competitive firms. Unions generally face a more inelastic demand in circumstances in which labor costs are smaller as a proportion of total costs (the importance of being unimportant). Thus, it is expected that unionization is greater in industries that are relatively capital intensive. Firms that are more capital intensive, or have higher fixed costs, also tend to be less mobile with respect to plant or office location.
Differences across industries in elasticities of substitution also result in differences in labor-demand elasticities. Empirical evidence suggests that, on average, highlyskilled (schooled) labor and capital are complementary."3 Thus, demand elastkci12More precisely, the demand for labor will be less elastic (1) the smaller the elasticity of demand for the final product, (2) the smaller the elasticity of substitution, (3) the smaller the ratio of labor costs to other costs (as long as the elasticity of substitution is less than the elasticity of demand for the final product), (4) the less elastic is the supply of substitute factors, and (5) the shorter the time period.
13See Zvi Griliches, "Capital-Skill Complementarity," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 51, No. 4 (November 1969) , pp. 465-68. For a recent summary of empirical evidence, see Daniel S. Hamermesh ties tend to be less and union power greater among firms in relatively capital intensive industries employing high-skill workers. Finally, labor demand is more inelastic the less elastic the supply of substitute factors. This suggests that union power should be greater where labor inputs are most specialized and where the availability of substitute factors (such as nonunion labor) is
The relationship between level of unionization and industrial structure is difficult to estimate. The use of highly aggregated industry categories may mask important intragroup differences in unionization level. However, use of detailed industry groupings, while possibly "explaining" much of the difference in unionization levels across labor markets, may simply capture differences in the model's other explanatory variables with which industry variables are correlated. In this paper, highly aggregated industry groupings are used. This makes it difficult to measure precisely the relationship between unionization and industrial structure outlined in the theory above, but it does allow for a more precise estimation of the relationship between unionization and the model's other variables.
It is expected that level of unionization will be higher, ceteris paribus, in labor markets with large employment shares in transportation, communication, and public utilities. Each of these industries tends to be highly concentrated (within an SMSA), and James Grant, "Econometric Studies of LaborLabor Substitution and Their Implications for Policy," Journal of Human Resources, forthcoming.
"4A similar analysis can be applied to unionization in the public sector. The ability of public employees to organize and extract wage and nonwage gains results in part because public employees often face a highly inelastic demand for their services, at least in the short run. Output demand may have a low elasticity because public services are often legal or quasi-monopolies, substitution in consumption by citizens may be quite difficult, substitution for regular public employees may be restricted, and the cost of services provided by individual employee groups is generally a small share of the total government budget (teachers are an exception at the local level). Of course demand elasticities will vary considerably with the particular service, city size, location, time, and as recently evident, public (voter) attitudes. publicly regulated, capital intensive, and skilled-labor intensive.'5 It is also expected that unionization will be relatively greater the larger are employment shares in manufacturing, particularly in durable manufacturing. This reflects the relatively lower organizing costs and greater expected benefits from organizing in highly concentrated industries with large plants. SMSAs will differ, of course, in their mix of durable and nondurable manufacturing industries; thus, this analysis will not account directly for intramanufacturing differences in unionization.
On the other hand, level of unionization is expected to be lower in labor markets with large employment shares in wholesale and retail trade, where concentration and capital intensity are generally low. Likewise, unionization is not expected to be high in service industries or finance, insurance, and real estate. Level of unionization is expected to be high on the average in both construction and mining; however, there are large interarea differences within these industries. In a previous study Lumsden and Petersen found level of unionization lower in states with larger employment shares in construction. 16 Variables measuring employment shares in construction and in mining are therefore included to examine their relationship with interarea differences in unionization. Finally, level of unionization is expected to be lower in labor markets with relatively larger shares of employment in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, each of these industries having relatively low demand for union services and high organizing costs. '6Lumsden and Petersen, "The Effect of Right-toWork Laws," also include variables for transportation and public utilities, and for mining and manufacturing (combined). Moore and Newman, "On the Prospects for American Trade Union Growth," do not examine the relationship between industry structure and unionization, while Warren and Strauss, Data and Specification This study uses SMSAs, rather than states, as units of observation. A metropolitan area corresponds most closely to the notion of a unified labor market, containing both the demand and supply forces on which our theory is based. The use of the SMSA also provides more degrees of freedom and prevents aggregation over large intrastate differences in labor markets.'7 Moreover, for purposes of estimating the effects of RTW laws, we are able to treat the existence of state RTW laws as exogenous to an SMSA, rather than being simultaneously determined with the level of unionization as is true at the state level. The assumption that RTW laws are exogenous is not entirely realistic; in most states, however, differences between a large urban area and the rest of the state are sufficiently large to make this assumption tenable.
Previous studies have used state data based on membership figures reported by the unions themselves. There is little quality control exercised over these figures and unions differ in whom they count as members.'8 We utilize two alternate unionization measures: one that uses individual survey data within SMSAs to measure union membership and one that measures bargaining coverage with individual establishments as the reporting unit. As a measure of union membership, data recently provided by Freeman and Medoff are used.'9 The variable, MEMBER, which we use to measure the percent of nonfarm private sector workers who are union members, was derived by Freeman and Medoff from the 1973 -75 Current Population Surveys. Sample size within some of the SMSAs is small, the smallest being 143. The unweighted mean of MEMBER across the 95 SMSAs "A Mixed Logit Model," include a variable measuring the combined percentage of employment in mining, construction, manufacturing, public utilities, and transportation.
17Unionization may vary widely across labor markets within the same state. Freeman and Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism," The bargaining coverage variable, CO V-ERA GE, is defined as the percent of private sector plant workers employed in establishments in which a majority of workers are covered by a labor-management contract during 1969-70.21 The percentage of covered plant workers is much higher than the percentage of all workers, the unweighted mean of the former across 86 SMSAs being 60.8 percent. It is assumed that CO VERA GE accurately reflects relative differences across SMSAs in bargaining coverage for all private sector workers.22 While some measurement error exists in both unionization variables, measurement error on a dependent variable will result only in a larger error term for the model; it will not bias regression coefficients.23
All explanatory variables utilized in the model, obtained directly or derived from the 1970 U. S. Census of Population, are defined in Table 1 . Our total sample includes 116 SMSAs for which data defining either the MEMBER or COVERAGE variables are available. The sample for MEM-BER includes 95 observations; that for 20Ibid. 2"For more details, see U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Area Wage Surveys, Bulletin No. 1660-1691, p. 6. Coverage figures are provided for 89 metropolitan areas, but two were dropped due to unavailable data on independent variables and one because it was evenly spread between a RTW and non-RTW state. In addition to government employment, the survey excludes agriculture, construction, mining, and very small establishments.
22This may not be a bad assumption. Calculations from data in Freeman and Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism," Table 5 , pp. 167-69, indicate a simple correlation of .97 across SMSAs between the percent of all private sector workers who were union members in 1973-75 and the percent of production (or plant) workers who were union members in that period.
23The CO VERA GE variable is given over a 4 percent range (the midpoint is used here), while Freeman and Medoff present the MEMBER variable rounded off to the nearest percent. Results Results from both the MEMBER and COVERAGE regressions indicate that the demand-supply framework presented above is fairly robust in explaining interarea differences in levels of unionization. Regres24The set of Zi variables are median schooling, percent with less than one year high school, percent with at least college degree, percent younger than 25 years old, percent older than 65, percent married, the log of population, and the male labor-force-participation rate.
sion results using OLS are presented in Table 2, while Table 3 presents 2SLS results utilizing an instrument for earnings. In the most complete specifications of the model, about 90 percent of the variation in membership and 80 percent of the variation in coverage are accounted for. Similarity in the qualitative results from both analyses increases confidence in the economic framework and the interpretation of results. The magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat sensitive to specification, possibly reflecting multicollinearity among the independent variables. The estimates are also affected by the sample of SMSAs (compare IM to IM' and IC to 1C').25 In comparing the relative responsiveness of MEM-BER and COVERAGE to changes in the explanatory variables, note that the mean of CO VERA GE is about three times that of MEMBER. Findings with respect to each of the model's variables are discussed below.
The level of earnings is found to be a positive determinant of both MEMBER and CO VERAGE, even after accounting for simultaneity between unionization and earnings. The earnings coefficient is also highly significant, except in the 2SLS COVERAGE equations. These results are consistent with predictions from demand theory, given that union services are a normal good, and with results of previous studies using simultaneous equation techniques with individual and industry data.26 Point estimates on EARNINGS' indicate that an increase in earnings level of a hundred dollars is associated with about a one percentage point increase in union membership and in coverage of plant workers.
As expected, unionization is negatively related to WHITE COLLAR, reflecting the systematic differences across occupations in the benefits and costs associated with union membership and with organizing. The weaker relationship of WHITE COLLAR with CO VERA GE than with MEMBER may reflect the fact that the share of covered 25Performance of Chow tests for the equality of coefficients between the joint and full samples yield F(30,41) = 2.20 from a comparison of 1M and 1M', and F(21,41) = 1.80 from a comparison of IC and IC'. Results were virtually identical using 2SLS results.
26See the references in footnote 6.
plant workers is an imperfect proxy for all workers. The choice of a white-collar rather than a blue-collar variable was made primarily on empirical grounds: the former was found to add more to the explained variation of the unionization equations. Union membership is negatively related to female labor-force participation, though the relationship is generally not significant when industry structure variables are included.27 While the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there are lower expected benefits from unionization and higher organizing costs associated with female workers, it also suggests that lower unionization among women is due to job characteristics as well as worker characteristics. The lower significance level of FEMLFP in the COVERAGE equations is consistent with the Freeman-Medoff evidence that relatively fewer covered women than covered men are union members.28
The relationship between race and level of unionization could not be posited a priori. Race is found to be negatively related to union membership while unrelated to contract coverage. It appears that the effects of past and current discrimination by unions, or in union jobs, outweigh the effects of the relatively larger wage benefits that nonwhites achieve as union members. It may also indicate that black workers are not less likely to vote for collective bargaining but are less prone to become a member if covered. This speculative point requires more direct evidence than is possible with these data. 27Lumsden and Petersen, "The Effect of Right-toWork Laws," account for some industry structure variables and also fail to find the percentage of women significant in their 1968 equation. Moore and Newman, "On the Prospect for American Trade Union Growth," find this variable significant, but do not include industry variables. Warren and Strauss, "A Mixed Logit Model," find this variable significant using OLS, but not with mixed logit.
28Freeman and Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism," Table 8 Two additional labor-force characteristics, schooling level and the percentage of senior workers (ages 45 to 64), were not found to be significantly related to either measure of level of unionization, after accounting for other determinants. These variables are thus not included in the regressions presented here.
The percentage change in population, CHANGEPOP, is found to be negatively related to both MEMBER and CO VERA GE. This finding is consistent with the argument that rapidly growing labor markets are more difficult to organize due to differences in worker mobility, firm attachment, and job structure, and the secular decline in new private sector unionism.
Effect on Contract Coverage
and Membership A major purpose of this study is to examine the effect of right-to-work laws on contract coverage and membership, after accounting for other measurable determinants of level of unionization. While the results reported here are hardly conclusive, they do strongly suggest that RTW laws have little effect on the extent of contract coverage but that they may decrease union membership. These results support the thesis presented earlier that RTW laws have no direct effect on the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively, but that they may decrease union membership due to free-rider effects.
The coefficient on RTW is negative and significant in all regressions with MEM-BER as the dependent variable. The 2SLS estimates presented in Table 3 As others have noted, not only to RTW laws affect unionization, but the level of unionization in a state is a primary determinant of the existence of a RTW law. Thus, with state data unionization and RTW must be estimated simultaneously. As discussed earlier, one advantage of SMSA rather than state data is that the assumption of RTW laws as exogenous is more acceptable. Still, the existence of simultaneity bias on the RTW coefficient cannot be ruled out. The existence of simultaneity over our sample of SMSAs, however, does not explain the differential effect of RTW laws on membership and coverage. (It should also be noted that the finding by others that RTW laws have little effect on union membership at the state level, even if correct, does not necessarily mean that either the repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, or the adoption of a national RTW law would have little effect on union membership in the country as a whole. That is, even if endogenous state RTW laws have had little past effect on membership, an 29Any results that are discussed, but not presented, are available from the author on request.
exogenous change in RTW laws at the federal level might nevertheless have a measurable impact.)
As developed above, economic theory suggests that the demand and supply for union services differ systematically across industries. General industry groupings showing the percentage of employment in each area are included in the regression models. Accounting for differences in industry structure across areas adds moderate explanatory power to the model and allows for more accurate measurement of the partial effects of the model's other variables. Joint F tests comparing the sums of squared errors from specification 1 of both the MEMBER and COVERAGE regressions with regressions with INDUSTRY excluded (not shown) allow us to reject at the .05 and .01 significance levels the hypothesis that the industry variables do not jointly increase the explanatory power of the model.30
The results from specification 3M and 3C indicate the strength of the relationship between level of unionization and the industry structure when not accounting for other determinants of unionization, and correspond with our expectations. Union membership is highest in areas with aboveaverage employment shares in transportation, communication, and utilities, and lowest in areas with above-average shares in finance, insurance, and real estate and in wholesale and retail trade. It is also lower to a statistically significant degree the larger are employment shares in construction, services, and nondurable manufacturing. The results with respect to contract coverage are similar; however, they should be interpreted with caution since COVERAGE measures only plant workers in the industries covered and does not cover agriculture, construction, or mining.
The coefficients on the INDUSTRY variables in the fully specified model measure the partial impact of industry structure, 30The F test comparing 1M to a regression with INDUSTRY excluded yields F(9,71) = 6.06, while comparison of IC with a similar equation yields F(9,62) = 3.43. The addition to explanatory power from INDUSTRY is significantly less when using the joint sample.
after accounting for personal characteristics, labor market characteristics, RTW laws, and region. Surprisingly, these results differ significantly both in magnitude and sign from the results in 3M and 3C. While the employment share in transportation, communication, and utilities continues to be associated with relatively greater membership, so do shares in finance, insurance, and real estate and in services. Relatively little difference in interarea unionization is found to result from differences between durable and nondurable manufacturing shares, or between manufacturing and construction or mining shares. A large agricultural share does appear to be associated with relatively less unionization. (Note that public administration was included only as a control for the relative size of the public sector; neither measure of unionization includes public employees.) While interarea differences in unionization are found to be significantly related to differences in industry mix, ceteris paribus, the relationship does not correspond closely to that which was expected. A possible explanation for this is that large interindustry differences in unionization result mainly from systematic differences across industries in worker characteristics, occupation, location, and earnings, rather than from differences in market structure and capital intensity per se. The relationship between industry structure and unionization clearly requires further study.
Despite the fact that there exist large interarea differences in unionization, the inclusion of eight regional dummies, to account for the nine census regions, adds relatively little to the explanatory power of the model.3' In no case are we able to reject, at a .01 significance level, the hypothesis that region makes no difference (see the F statistics in Table 2 ). This implies that most regional differences in urban unionization can be explained by differences in worker and labor market characteristics and industry structure. While tastes clearly matter, differences in attitude across metropolitan areas may 3'Regressions of MEMBER and COVERAGE on the regional variables alone yield R2s of .57 and .53 respectively. not be large. While differences among regions are not large, the coefficients on the regional dummies are of interest. Table 4 presents mean level of unionization by region and the regional coefficients and t-ratios from the 2SLS equations presented in Table 3 . These coefficients are presumed to measure regional differences in attitudes as well as differences not captured by the other independent variables. Regional differences appear to be associated with lower membership in the New England, South Atlantic, and Mountain regions, and higher membership in the West North Central, East South Central, and Middle Atlantic regions.
Summary
This study utilizes two previously unused data sources on unionization to examine the determinants of union membership and collective bargaining coverage across
SMSAs. An economic framework is developed in which equilibrium levels of unionization are viewed as determined by demand and supply forces. The model is found to be relatively robust when using either dependent variable, thus increasing confidence in the appropriateness of an economic framework.
Unionization levels are found to be positively related to an area's earnings level and negatively to its percentage of white-collar workers. The industry structure in an area is also a significant determinant, but interarea differences in the sex and racial composition of the labor force, and population growth appear to affect unionization to a lesser degree. Region also has only a small effect after accounting for other determinants of unionization. Finally, the results indicate that while RTW laws have little, if any, effect on the extent of collective bargaining coverage across SMSAs, such laws do appear to decrease the level of union membership.
